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1PREAMBLE
by Graham S. Pearson* & Nicholas A Sims†
Introduction
1.   The Ad Hoc Group (AHG) is considering measures to strengthen the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) through a legally binding instrument.  The pace of the
AHG negotiations has quickened during the past year and there is now a clear political will to
see the negotiation of the Protocol completed as soon as possible before the Fifth Review
Conference in 2001.    It is now evident that several Articles in the draft Protocol are now
largely agreed and will not develop significantly from their current form although a certain
amount of restructuring may be agreed at a later stage.
2.   In Evaluation Paper No 1 in July 1999 it was concluded1 that "the majority of the Articles
in the draft Protocol have now reached the stage when they have had multiple readings and
are unlikely to change significantly during the coming months as the negotiations enter the
end-game.   It is therefore timely to commence the production of a series of Evaluation
Papers which will consider Article by Article the current state of each Article of the
Protocol."   By the end of 1999, Evaluation Papers had been prepared for 14 of the 23
Articles, over half of all the Articles of the Protocol. This Evaluation Paper continues this
series by considering the Preamble on which the AHG has made progress with the current
rolling text containing some 20 sets of square brackets.
Preamble
3.   In January 2000, the text2 for the Preamble had developed further from its earlier versions
with a regrouping of the paragraphs and now was as follows:
PREAMBLE
The States Parties to this Protocol,
(1) Being Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and
on Their Destruction, which was opened for signature on 10 April 1972, and entered
into force on 26 March 1975, hereinafter referred to as the Convention,
[(2) Reaffirming their determination for the sake of all mankind to exclude
completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used
as weapons,]
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2[(3) Determined for the sake of all peoples to exclude completely the possibility of
the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, retention or use of biological
and toxin weapons through the implementation of this Protocol, furthering the
principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Convention,]
[(4) Reaffirming the purposes laid down in the preamble to the Convention,]
(5) Mindful of their obligations under the Convention and desiring to further its
objectives,
[(6) Mindful of their obligations under the Convention never in any circumstances
to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain microbial or other
biological agents or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types
and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other
peaceful purposes or weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such
agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict,]
(7) Determined to implement all the provisions of the Convention in a
comprehensive and balanced manner,
[(8) Reaffirming the final declarations of the successive Review Conferences of the
Convention,]
[(9) Noting the reaffirmation by the States Parties to the Convention at the Fourth
Review Conference that the use by States Parties, in any way and under any
circumstances, of microbial or other biological agents or toxins, that is not consistent
with prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes, is effectively a violation of
Article I of the Convention,]
OR
[(8+9) Considering the final declarations of the successive Review Conferences of the
Convention, and noting the reaffirmation by the States Parties to the Convention at
the Fourth Review Conference that the use by States Parties, in any way and under
any circumstances, of microbial or other biological agents or toxins, that is not
consistent with prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes, is effectively a
violation of Article I of the Convention,]
[(10) Emphasizing that the use by States Parties in any way and under any
circumstances of microbial or other biological agents or toxins, that is not consistent
with prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes, is effectively a violation of
Article I of the Convention,]
(11) Reaffirming that the [implementation of the provisions of the] Convention is
essential for maintaining and enhancing regional and international peace and
security [and development],
(12) Convinced that strengthening and enhancing the preamble and the provisions
of the Convention, adopting specific measures to improve its implementation and
effectiveness, and encouraging universal adherence to the Convention and this
3Protocol, will deliver significant benefits in terms of international security and
development,
[(13) Determined to achieve effective progress toward the prohibition and complete
elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction,
(14) Determined also to achieve effective progress toward general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective international control,]
OR
[(13+14)  Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress toward
general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,
including the prohibition of all types of weapons of mass destruction,]
[(15) Desiring to contribute to the realization and purposes of the Charter of the
United Nations,]
(16) Reaffirming their adherence to the principles and objectives of the Protocol
for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and
of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925 (Geneva
Protocol of 1925), [and their commitment to strictly comply with them,] [and calling
upon all States to strictly comply with them,]
(17) Welcoming the entry into force of the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their
Destruction, signed at Paris on 13 January 1993,
(18) Recognizing the significant advances in the field of biotechnology since the
entry into force of the Convention, and the potential implications, both positive and
negative, of these advances for the implementation and effectiveness of the
Convention,
(19) Determined to ensure that all achievements in this field are used exclusively
for the benefit of mankind,
[(20) Conscious of the apprehension arising from relevant scientific and
technological developments as expressed by States Parties at Review Conferences of
their use for purposes inconsistent with the objectives and the provisions of the
Convention,]
[(21) Reaffirming the obligation of each State Party to the Convention under
Article III not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in
any way to assist, encourage, or induce any State, group of States or international
organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons,
equipment or means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention,]
[(22) Concerned with the increasing gap between the developed and the developing
countries in the field of biotechnology, genetic engineering, microbiology and other
related areas,]
4(23) Desiring to promote international cooperation and exchange of
bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins, and equipment, materials and scientific
and technological information in the field of biotechnology for purposes not
prohibited under the Convention to [enhance] [ensure] the economic and
technological development of all States Parties [to the Protocol],
(24) Emphasizing the increasing importance of the implementation of the
provisions of Article X of the Convention and the obligations of each State Party
under that Article [as well as under Article VII of the Protocol], especially in the light
of recent scientific and technological developments in the field of biotechnology,
bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes, which have
vastly increased the potential for cooperation between States to help to promote
economic and social development, and scientific and technological progress
[particularly in developing countries] [in conformity with interests, needs and
priorities],
[(25) Recalling that, in accordance with the Declaration of Principles adopted at
the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, States should
cooperate to strengthen endogenous capacity-building for sustainable development by
improving scientific understanding through exchanges of scientific and technical
knowledge, and by enhancing the development, adaptation, diffusion and transfer of
technologies, including new and innovative technologies,]
[(26) Determined to promote international cooperation on all developments in the
field of frontier science and high technology in areas relevant to the Convention, and
urging the developed countries possessing advanced biotechnology and knowledge in
such fields as medicine, public health and agriculture to adopt positive measures and
to continue to promote technology transfer and cooperation on an equal and non-
discriminatory basis, in particular with the developing countries, for the benefit of all
mankind,]
(27) Convinced that to contribute as effectively as possible to the prevention of [the
proliferation of] [weapons of mass destruction, including] biological and toxin
weapons, and thereby to enhance international peace and security, all States Parties
to the Convention should become States Parties to this Protocol,
(28) Convinced that the most effective way to ensure a world free of biological and
toxin weapons is to strengthen the Convention through appropriate measures, [in
particular] [including] through enhanced transparency and compliance provisions,
(29) Determined to strengthen and improve the effective implementation of the
Convention,
Have agreed as follows:
Thus far, there has been no text provided in Part II by the Friend of the Chair for the
Preamble.
4.  The aim of the Preamble is to set out the hopes, aspirations and purposes of the Protocol
and to set this in the context of relevant treaties.  It is useful to compare the Preamble for the
5Protocol with the Preamble to the BTWC3 :
The States Parties to this Convention,
Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and
complete disarmament, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of
weapons of mass destruction, and convinced that the prohibition of the development,
production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological(biological) weapons and
their elimination, through effective measures, will facilitate the achievement of
general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,
Recognizing the important significance of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use
in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of
Warfare, signed at Geneva on June 17, 1925, and conscious also of the contribution
which the said Protocol has already made, and continues to make, to mitigating the
horrors of war,
Reaffirming their adherence to the principles and objectives of that Protocol and
calling upon all States to comply strictly with them,
Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations has repeatedly condemned
all actions contrary to the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of June
17, 1925,
Desiring to contribute to the strengthening of confidence between peoples and the
general improvement of the international atmosphere,
Desiring also to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the
United Nations,
Convinced of the importance and urgency of eliminating from the arsenals of States,
through effective measures, such dangerous weapons of mass destruction as those
using chemical or bacteriological (biological) agents,
Recognizing that an agreement on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and
toxin weapons represents a first possible step towards the achievement of agreement
on effective measures also for the prohibition of the development, production and
stockpiling of chemical weapons, and determined to continue negotiations to that end,
Determined for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of
bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons,
Convinced that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind and that
no effort should be spared to minimize this risk,
Have agreed as follows:
                                                
3United Nations, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Resolutions adopted by the General
Assembly, Official Records: Twenty-Sixth Session, 2826 (XXVI), 16 December 1971.
6and with that to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)4
PREAMBLE
The States Parties to this Convention,
Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and
complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, including the
prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction,
Desiring to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter
of the United Nations,
Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations has repeatedly condemned
all actions contrary to the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the
Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925 (the Geneva
Protocol of 1925),
Recognizing that this Convention reaffirms principles and objectives of and
obligations assumed under the Geneva Protocol of 1925, and the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction signed at London, Moscow
and Washington on 10 April 1972,
Bearing in mind the objective contained in Article IX of the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction,
Determined for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of the
use of chemical weapons, through the implementation of the provisions of this
Convention, thereby complementing the obligations assumed under the Geneva
Protocol of 1925,
Recognizing the prohibition, embodied in the pertinent agreements and relevant
principles of international law, of the use of herbicides as a method of warfare,
Considering that achievements in the field of chemistry should be used exclusively for
the benefit of mankind,
Desiring to promote free trade in chemicals as well as international cooperation and
exchange of scientific and technical information in the field of chemical activities for
purposes not prohibited under this Convention in order to enhance the economic and
technological development of all States Parties,
Convinced that the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production,
acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer and use of chemical weapons, and their
                                                
4Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, Available on the web at
http://www.opcw.nl
7destruction, represent a necessary step towards the achievement of these common
objectives,
Have agreed as follows:
5.  As might be expected, the Preamble to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is less
comparable because of the difference between the purposes on the one hand of the BTWC, its
Protocol and the CWC and, on the other hand, of the CTBT.   Nevertheless, for completeness,
the CTBT Preamble5 is reproduced here:
PREAMBLE
The States Parties to this Treaty (hereinafter referred to as "the States
Parties"),
Welcoming the international agreements and other positive measures of recent years
in the field of nuclear disarmament, including reductions in arsenals of nuclear
weapons, as well as in the field of the prevention of nuclear proliferation in all its
aspects,
Underlining the importance of the full and prompt implementation of such agreements
and measures,
Convinced that the present international situation provides an opportunity to take
further effective measures towards nuclear disarmament and against the proliferation
of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, and declaring their intention to take such
measures,
Stressing therefore the need for continued systematic and progressive efforts to
reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those
weapons, and of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control,
Recognizing that the cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other
nuclear explosions, by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of
nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear
weapons, constitutes an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-
proliferation in all its aspects,
Further recognizing that an end to all such nuclear explosions will thus constitute a
meaningful step in the realization of a systematic process to achieve nuclear
disarmament,
Convinced that the most effective way to achieve an end to nuclear testing is through
the conclusion of a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable
comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, which has long been one of the highest
priority objectives of the international community in the field of disarmament and
non-proliferation,
                                                
5Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.   Available at http://www.ctbto.org/ctbto/pdf/cbten.pdf
8Noting the aspirations expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear
Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water to seek to achieve
the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time,
Noting also the views expressed that this Treaty could contribute to the protection of
the environment,
Affirming the purpose of attracting the adherence of all States to this Treaty and its
objective to contribute effectively to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear
weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the
enhancement of international peace and security,
Have agreed as follows:
Evaluation
6.   The current text for the Preamble has developed from that proposed in two Working
Papers submitted in July 1997 by the United States6 and Australia7 which comprised 10 and
15 paragraphs respectively as well as the later version proposed in a Working Paper submitted
in April 1999 by Australia8 which comprised 9 paragraphs.   The current version comprises
some 29 paragraphs.
7.  The Preamble for the Protocol contains paragraphs that fall into two broad categories --
paragraphs that reflect those in the preamble of the BTWC and CWC, and paragraphs that
refer to specific purposes of the Convention.   It is convenient to consider them in the
sequence in which they currently appear in the draft Protocol9.
8.  The sequence of the paragraphs is a logical one.  The initial paragraphs, 1 to 12, emphasize
the Convention which it is the purpose of the Protocol to strengthen whilst the next
paragraphs, 13 to 17, place the Protocol in related contexts, outside the Convention.  These
internal and external sections are followed by a combination of internal and external
references in paragraphs 18 to 26 which stress the development content (Article X) of the
BTWC and related contexts outside the Convention.  A final section, paragraphs 27 to 29,
leads in to Article I of the Protocol.   Although the number of paragraphs is likely to be
reduced from the present 29 when overlaps and duplications are eliminated, the Preamble will
still be much longer than those of the BTWC, CWC and CTBT, each of which confines its
Preamble to a mere 10 paragraphs.  In this evaluation, the preambular paragraphs are
considered in four groups: internal section, related contexts, development section and the
final section leading in to Article I of the Protocol.
9.  It is also noted that further preambular paragraphs are frequently, for quite understandable
reasons, added at a late stage in the negotiation of a treaty, as part of a compromise over the
main text or operative part of the treaty.  A good example is in the seventh paragraph of the
                                                
6 United States of America, Working Paper submitted by the United States of America, Preamble, BWC/AD
HOC GROUP/WP.176, 21 July 1997.
7Australia, Working Paper submitted by Australia, Preamble, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.191, 24 July 1997.
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9 United Nations, Procedural Report of the Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons
and on their Destruction, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/50 (Part I), 11 February 2000, Geneva.
9CWC Preamble, "Recognizing the prohibition, embodied in the pertinent agreements and
relevant principles of international law, of the use of herbicides as a method of warfare,"
which was added in June 1992 as an acceptable substitute for making any reference to
herbicides in the Articles of the CWC.10
10.  Should the Preamble to the Protocol be used for this purpose, probably at a late stage in
the negotiation of the Protocol, it will be important to preserve the logical structure of the
Preamble through minimizing disruption to the sequence of paragraphs.
Internal Section
11.  Paragraphs 1 to 12 anchor the purpose of the Protocol firmly in those of the BTWC and
provide a statement of the reasons for the importance of the Convention in its own right.  The
statement could be rendered more concise:  paragraphs (9) and (10) are effectively
alternatives, as is (8+9) and paragraphs (2) and (3) duplicate much of their content.
Paragraph (6) would no longer duplicate the content of paragraph (5) if the words Article I of
were to be introduced before the Convention in the first line, thereby making paragraph (6)
significantly more specific than paragraph (5).   We also recommend an abbreviation of
paragraph (3) so that the BTWC Protocol and the 1925 Geneva Protocol are not prematurely
introduced in this section of the Preamble, to the detriment of the emphasis on the
Convention alone.
12.   The first paragraph, which is out of square brackets, is unexceptionable as it emphasizes,
as might be expected, that the States Parties to the Protocol are necessarily Parties to the
Convention.
13.  The second paragraph, currently within square brackets, reaffirms the determination set
out in the ninth paragraph of the BTWC using identical language.  It is similar to the sixth
paragraph in the CWC although that paragraph goes on to add the words through the
implementation of the provisions of this Convention, thereby complementing the obligations
assumed under the Geneva Protocol of 1925.   We would recommend removal of the current
square brackets.   Although the Preamble could be shortened by deletion of this paragraph
without loss to the substance of the Preamble as its content is included more generally in the
fourth paragraph and more specifically in the  third paragraph, it is recognised that as with the
Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference there is a wish to make it unequivocally
clear that the use of biological agents and toxins as weapons is completely excluded.
14.  The third paragraph, in square brackets, is similar to but stronger, through the explicit
mention of the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, retention or use, than the
language in the ninth paragraph of the BTWC preamble which is limited to the possibility of
... being used as weapons.  It is likewise stronger than the sixth paragraph of the CWC. This
paragraph would be more effective in its present context if it terminated at weapons and we
recommend this amendment.
15.  The fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh paragraphs, of which the fourth and sixth are in
square brackets, reaffirm the purposes laid down in the Preamble to the BTWC, remind of the
obligations undertaken under the BTWC and determine to implement all the provisions of the
BTWC in a comprehensive and balanced manner.   We would recommend the insertion of
                                                
10 Walter Krutzsch and Ralf Trapp, A Commentary on the Chemical Weapons Convention, Dordrecht, Martinus
Nijhoff, 1994, pp. 8 - 10.
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Article I of before the Convention in the first line of paragraph (6) to make this paragraph
significantly more specific than paragraph (5).
16.  The eighth and ninth paragraphs and the alternative (8+9), all in square brackets, reaffirm
the Final Declarations of the Review Conferences and note the reaffirmation by the Fourth
Review Conference concerning use in any way and under any circumstances as being a
violation of Article I.  The alternative (8+9), also in square brackets, is weaker in that it only
considers and does not reaffirm the final declarations of the successive Review Conferences.
We consequently do not recommend the alternative (8+9).
17.  The tenth paragraph, in square brackets, largely reiterates what was said in the ninth
paragraph using a different form of words which does not refer to the Fourth Review
Conference.   Our preference would be to remove the square brackets from the eighth and the
tenth paragraphs and to delete the ninth and the (8+9) paragraphs.
14.  The eleventh paragraph, now emerging from square brackets, reaffirms that the BTWC is
essential for international peace and security.   The first clause within square brackets
[implementation of the provisions of the] was added in the November 1999 consideration of
the Preamble; it effectively refers to the fact that the Protocol will facilitate the
implementation of the provisions of the Convention.  The second clause within square
brackets [and development] extends the relevance of the Convention beyond maintaining and
enhancing regional and international peace to development; this effectively refers to the
inclusion within the Protocol of measures to implement Article X of the Convention.  Our
view is that this paragraph would largely repeat what is expressed in paragraph (12) if the
clauses within square brackets were retained, but that with those clauses deleted it would be
more effective.  We therefore recommend that this paragraph be left in its shorter form as a
simple reaffirmation.
15.  The twelfth paragraph, out of square brackets, expresses the conviction that the Protocol
will deliver significant benefits in terms of international security and development, and recalls
the importance of encouraging universal adherence to both the Convention and the Protocol
for this purpose.
Related Contexts
16.   Preambular paragraphs (13) to (17) place the Protocol in related contexts, outside the
Convention.  The order of the paragraphs here resembles that of the CWC in respect of four
of its first five preambular paragraphs:  weapons of mass destruction, general and complete
disarmament;  Charter of the United Nations;  Geneva Protocol;  CWC.   There is, however,
no equivalent to the third preambular paragraph of the CWC, which recalled condemnation by
the General Assembly of all actions contrary to the principles and objectives of the Geneva
Protocol.
17.  In the past, there has sometimes been a 'contest of contexts' over which context should
take priority.  The Drafting Committee at the BTWC First Review Conference experienced
such a contest over just these above named contexts -- disarmament, UN texts, Geneva
Protocol, CWC (then still the goal of BTWC Article IX) -- at its meeting on 19 March 198011,
when it was still trying to finalize the order of paragraphs in the preamble to the Final
                                                
11 Nicholas A. Sims, The Diplomacy of Biological Disarmament:  Vicissitudes of a Treaty in Force, 1975-85,
London: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988, pp 129 - 30.
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Declaration of that Review Conference.   The order of paragraphs proposed in this section of
the Protocol Preamble should be the more acceptable for having been the sequence followed
in the CWC.
18.  The thirteenth paragraph, in square brackets surrounding both (13) and (14), uses closely
similar but somewhat stronger language to that in the first phrase of the first paragraph of the
BTWC Preamble.  The thirteenth paragraph is stronger through the insertion of complete
before the word elimination.
19.  The fourteenth paragraph, also in the square brackets surrounding both (13) and (14),
uses closely similar language to that at the end of the first paragraph of the BTWC Preamble.
This language is essentially identical to that in the final phrase of the fourth paragraph of the
CTBT.
20.  The alternative paragraph (13 + 14), in square brackets, uses language that is closely
similar to that in the first and last clauses of the first paragraph of the BTWC.  It is identical
with the first preambular paragraph of the CWC except that it omits the phrase and
elimination which is found in both the CWC and the BTWC Preambles.  The Protocol
paragraph is therefore weaker than its equivalent paragraphs in the BTWC and CWC
Preambles, as it only emphasizes the prohibition and not the elimination of all types of
weapons of mass destruction.   We recommend the addition of the words and elimination
after the prohibition of should this combined paragraph be retained.  However, we note the
emphasis being placed elsewhere on making progress in the implementation of Article VI of
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in which "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes
to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to...nuclear
disarmament..."   Consequently, we recommend that the two separate paragraphs (13) and
(14) should emerge from square brackets as this will result in greater clarity in the Preamble
and that the combined paragraph should be deleted.
21.  The fifteenth paragraph, surprisingly within square brackets, is identical to the sixth
paragraph of the BTWC and to the second paragraph of the CWC.   In their commentary on
that CWC paragraph, Krutzsch and Trapp12 identify the following UN purposes and
principles as those to the realization of which the CWC should contribute: "elimination of the
danger of war, elimination of the threat and use of force from international life, the sovereign
equality of States, peaceful settlement of disputes." and the contribution of the BTWC
Protocol is likely to be similar.  We recommend removal of the square brackets.
22.  The sixteenth paragraph, out of square brackets although with two final clauses within
square brackets, is broadly similar to the first part of the second paragraph of the BTWC
although the sixteenth paragraph usefully emphasizes the adherence of States Parties to the
principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol.   The penultimate clause emphasizes the
commitment to strictly comply with these principles and objectives whilst the final clause
calls upon all States and not just States Parties to strictly comply with these principles and
objectives.
23.  It should be noted that the language of "principles and objectives" was employed in the
third and fourth paragraphs of the BTWC Preamble in order to accommodate those states, not
yet parties to the Geneva Protocol, which could nevertheless identify themselves with its
                                                
12 Walter Krutzsch and Ralf Trapp, A Commentary on the Chemical Weapons Convention, Dordrecht, Martinus
Nijhoff, 1994, pp. 7 - 8.
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principles and objectives.  Among them was the United States where, from 1970 to 1974, the
Geneva Protocol was once again awaiting the Senate's advice and consent to ratification.13
24.  Since 1975, when the United States ratified the Geneva Protocol, there has been no
difficulty expanding the phrase, as in the preambular paragraph 4 of the CWC, to principles
and objectives of and obligations assumed under the Protocol.  We recommend the addition
of and obligations assumed under in the first line of paragraph (16).   The square bracketed
portion of the paragraph would then need to be expanded thus:
and calling upon all States to comply strictly with the principles and objectives of
that Protocol and upon all States Parties to that Protocol to comply strictly with
their obligations assumed under it.
and the square brackets removed.  The words "to comply strictly" are drawn from the third
preambular paragraph of the BTWC itself.  They are preferable to the split infinitive "to
strictly comply" found in the current text drafted for the BTWC Protocol.  We have used that
Protocol to make it clear that the reference is to the Geneva Protocol and not the BTWC
Protocol.
25.  The seventeenth paragraph, out of square brackets, welcomes the entry into force of the
CWC.
Development Section
26.  Preambular paragraphs (18) to (26) stress the development content (Article X) of the
BTWC and related contexts outside the BTWC, such as the Rio 1992 Declaration of
Principles in paragraph (25).  The emphasis on the development content (Article X) is
unsurprising given the specific mention of Article X in the mandate of the Ad Hoc Group.
Paragraph (21) provides some balance by emphasizing the obligations of Article III of the
Convention.
27. The eighteenth paragraph, out of square brackets, recognizes the significant advances in
biotechnology since 1975 and their potential implications for the implementation and the
effectiveness of the Convention.
28.  The nineteenth paragraph, out of square brackets, is similar, although stronger as the
Protocol language is Determined, to that language in the eighth paragraph of the CWC which
uses Considering in regard to achievements in the field of chemistry.
29.   The twentieth paragraph, within square brackets, refers back obliquely to the important
statements in the Final Declarations of successive Review Conferences which reaffirm that
the undertaking given by all States Parties in Article I is sufficiently comprehensive to cover
all relevant scientific and technological developments.  It is this language which ensures that
the scope of the prohibition remains unequivocally all-embracing.  This paragraph would be
strengthened if this were made clearer by the addition at the end of the words "and of their
reaffirmation that Article I is sufficiently comprehensive to cover all such developments."
Our recommendation is that these words should be added and the square brackets removed.
                                                
13 The United States had signed the Geneva Protocol on 17 June 1925 but it was removed from the agenda of the
Senate in 1947 and not restored to the agenda until 1970.
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30.  The twenty-first paragraph, within square brackets, reaffirms and reiterates the non-
transfer obligation on States Parties to the Convention under Article III.   This reiteration
provides balance to the emphasis in paragraphs (23) and (24) on promoting international
cooperation and exchange and the obligations under Article X of the Convention.  Our
recommendation is that the square brackets should be removed.
31.  The twenty-second paragraph, within square brackets, refers to the increasing gap
between the developed and developing countries in the field of microbiology.   This reiterates
the language of Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference14 which under Article X
said that The Conference...notes with concern the increasing gap between the developed and
the developing countries in the field of biotechnology, genetic engineering and microbiology
and other related areas.  Our recommendation is that the square brackets should be removed.
32.  The twenty-third paragraph, largely out of square brackets, promotes international
cooperation and exchange to [enhance][ensure] the economic and technological
development of all States Parties [to the Protocol].   We recommend adoption of the word
enhance rather than ensure as international cooperation and exchange alone cannot ensure the
economic and technological development of all States Parties to the Protocol.  We also
recommend removal of the square brackets from the phrase to the Protocol as it is particularly
through becoming a State Party to the Protocol that the objective of this preambular paragraph
will be achieved.
33.  The twenty-fourth paragraph, largely out of square brackets, emphasizes the increasing
importance of the implementation of the provisions of Article X of the Convention.  It has
square brackets around the words [as well as under Article VII of the Protocol] which extend
the reference to the obligations of each State Party under Article X.   Our view is that this
extension is inappropriate in a preambular paragraph and consequently the phrase within
square brackets is best deleted.  Square brackets are also round the final words of this
paragraph [particularly in developing countries][in conformity with interests, needs and
priorities].   This language also reiterates language from the Final Declaration of the Fourth
Review Conference15 which in respect of Article X stated that ...which have vastly increased
the potential for cooperation between States to help to promote economic and social
development, and scientific and technological progress, particularly in developing countries,
in conformity with their interests, needs and priorities.  We would recommend adoption of
the same language as in the Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference.
34.  The twenty-fifth paragraph, still within square brackets, recalls the Declaration of
Principles at the Rio summit of 1992.  Our view is that the square brackets should be
removed as it is appropriate to note that there are initiatives other than the Protocol to
promote capacity-building and to encourage technical exchanges and the transfer of
technologies.
35.  The twenty-sixth paragraph, still within square brackets, is thus largely similar to
                                                
14United Nations, Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, Geneva, 25 November - 6 December 1996, BWC/CONF.IV/9, Geneva, 1996.  Final Declaration,
Part II, p. 23.
15United Nations, Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, Geneva, 25 November - 6 December 1996, BWC/CONF.IV/9, Geneva, 1996.  Final Declaration,
Part II, p. 23.
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language from the Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference16 which in respect of
Article X stated that The Conference urges all States Parties actively to continue to promote
international cooperation and exchange with States Parties in the peaceful uses of
biotechnology, and urges all States Parties possessing advanced biotechnology to adopt
positive measures and to continue to promote technology transfer and cooperation on an
equal and non-discriminatory basis, in particular with the developing countries, for the
benefit of all mankind.   The preambular paragraph seeks to broaden the scope of this
paragraph by the words all developments in the field of frontier science and high technology
in areas relevant to the Convention.   It then goes on to urge the developed countries rather
than the States Parties possessing advanced biotechnology to adopt positive measures.  It also
broadens the language from possessing advanced biotechnology to possessing advanced
biotechnology and knowledge in such fields as medicine, public health and agriculture.  Our
recommendation would be to amend this paragraph to follow more closely the language of the
Fourth Review Conference although we would support the use of the broader scope in
retaining the words possessing advanced biotechnology and knowledge in such fields as
medicine, public health and agriculture.
36.  It is, however, pertinent to ask whether it is necessary, or desirable, to repeat essentially
three statements from the Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference in paragraphs
(22), (24) and (26) as well as to express closely similar aspirations in paragraph (23). After
all, paragraph (8) has already reaffirmed the final declarations of the successive Review
Conferences.  Our recommendation is that these five paragraphs (22) to (26) should be
reordered so that the sequence is (22), (25), (24) and (26) and thereby progresses from the
concerned to the determined as well as from the general to the specific.   We recommend that
paragraph (23) be dropped as this adds little to the substance and is weaker than (26).
Final Section
37.  Preambular paragraph (27) emphasizes the desirability of all States Parties to the BTWC
becoming parties to the Protocol.  Paragraph (28) stresses the importance of the measures in
the Protocol to strengthen the Convention leading to the final paragraph (29) which by
recalling the mandate of the Ad Hoc Group to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the
implementation serves to lead into the Articles, or operative part, of the Protocol.  All three
paragraphs (27) to (29) are out of square brackets although there are words within square
brackets within the first two paragraphs.
38.  The twenty-seventh paragraph, largely out of square brackets, encourages all States
Parties to the Convention to become States Parties to the Protocol.  The initial language to
contribute as effectively as possible to the prevention of [the proliferation of] [weapons of
mass destruction, including] biological and toxin weapons, appears weak as there is no
mention of prohibition or of elimination which are already in paragraphs (13) and (13 + 14).
We would recommend strengthening (27) to read:
(27) Convinced that to contribute as effectively as possible to the prohibition and
complete elimination of biological and toxin weapons, and thereby to enhance
international peace and security, all States Parties to the Convention should become
                                                
16 United Nations, Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, Geneva, 25 November - 6 December 1996, BWC/CONF.IV/9, Geneva, 1996.  Final Declaration,
Part II, p. 23.
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States Parties to this Protocol,
39.  The twenty-eighth paragraph, largely free of square brackets, refers to the strengthening
of the Convention through appropriate measures, [in particular] [including] through
enhanced transparency and compliance provisions.  As we have noted in our evaluation17 of
Article IX The Organization, this language is much weaker than in the comparable CWC and
the CTBT language.  We would recommend strengthening this to read
(28) Convinced that the most effective way to ensure a world free of biological and
toxin weapons is to strengthen the Convention through appropriate measures,
including provisions for international verification of compliance with such
measures,
40.  The twenty-ninth paragraph, out of square brackets, (29) Determined to strengthen and
improve the effective implementation of the Convention, then leads into the Protocol.   There
is much to be said for using language in Article I General Provisions to achieve a smoother
transition from the Preamble into that Article.  This could be achieved by a paragraph in
which States Parties undertake to strengthen the Convention through appropriate measures,
including provisions for international verification of compliance with such measures,
Strikethrough text for the Preamble
41.  It is recommended that the Preamble should read as follows:
PREAMBLE
The States Parties to this Protocol,
(1) Being Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and
on Their Destruction, which was opened for signature on 10 April 1972, and entered
into force on 26 March 1975, hereinafter referred to as the Convention,
[(2) Reaffirming their determination for the sake of all mankind to exclude
completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used
as weapons,]
[(3) Determined for the sake of all peoples to exclude completely the possibility of
the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, retention or use of biological
and toxin weapons, through the implementation of this Protocol, furthering the
principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Convention,]
[(4) Reaffirming the purposes laid down in the preamble to the Convention,]
(5) Mindful of their obligations under the Convention and desiring to further its
objectives,
[(6) Mindful of their obligations under Article I of the Convention never in any
                                                
17 Ian R. Kenyon, Graham S. Pearson & Nicholas A. Sims, Article IX: The Organization, Evaluation Paper No
14, University of Bradford, January 2000, p 7.  Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
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circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain microbial
or other biological agents or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of
types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other
peaceful purposes or weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such
agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict,]
(7) Determined to implement all the provisions of the Convention in a
comprehensive and balanced manner,
[(8) Reaffirming the final declarations of the successive Review Conferences of the
Convention,]
[(9)      Noting the reaffirmation by the States Parties to the Convention at the Fourth
Review Conference that the use by States Parties, in any way and under any
circumstances, of microbial or other biological agents or toxins, that is not consistent
with prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes, is effectively a violation of
Article I of the Convention,]
OR
[(8+9)  Considering the final declarations of the successive Review Conferences of the
Convention, and noting the reaffirmation by the States Parties to the Convention at
the Fourth Review Conference that the use by States Parties, in any way and under
any circumstances, of microbial or other biological agents or toxins, that is not
consistent with prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes, is effectively a
violation of Article I of the Convention,]
(9) [(10) Emphasizing that the use by States Parties in any way and under any
circumstances of microbial or other biological agents or toxins, that is not consistent
with prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes, is effectively a violation of
Article I of the Convention,]
(10)(11) Reaffirming that the [implementation of the provisions of the]
Convention is essential for maintaining and enhancing regional and international
peace and security [and development],
(11)(12) Convinced that strengthening and enhancing the preamble and the
provisions of the Convention, adopting specific measures to improve its
implementation and effectiveness, and encouraging universal adherence to the
Convention and this Protocol, will deliver significant benefits in terms of
international security and development,
(12)[(13) Determined to achieve effective progress toward the prohibition and
complete elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction,
(13)(14) Determined also to achieve effective progress toward general and
complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,]
OR
[(13+14)  Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress toward
general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,
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including the prohibition of all types of weapons of mass destruction,]
(14)[(15) Desiring to contribute to the realization and purposes of the Charter of
the United Nations,]
(15)(16) Reaffirming their adherence to the principles and objectives of and
obligations assumed under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare,
signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925 (Geneva Protocol of 1925), [and their commitment
to strictly comply with them,] [and calling upon all States to comply strictly with the
principles and objectives of that Protocol and upon all States Parties to that
Protocol to comply strictly with their obligations assumed under it,  them,]
(16)(17) Welcoming the entry into force of the Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
Their Destruction, signed at Paris on 13 January 1993,
(17)(18) Recognizing the significant advances in the field of biotechnology since
the entry into force of the Convention, and the potential implications, both positive
and negative, of these advances for the implementation and effectiveness of the
Convention,
(18)(19) Determined to ensure that all achievements in this field are used
exclusively for the benefit of mankind,
(19)[(20) Conscious of the apprehension arising from relevant scientific and
technological developments as expressed by States Parties at Review Conferences of
their use for purposes inconsistent with the objectives and the provisions of the
Convention, and of their reaffirmation that Article I is sufficiently comprehensive to
cover all such developments,]
(20)[(21) Reaffirming the obligation of each State Party to the Convention under
Article III not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in
any way to assist, encourage, or induce any State, group of States or international
organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons,
equipment or means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention,]
(21)[(22) Concerned with the increasing gap between the developed and the
developing countries in the field of biotechnology, genetic engineering, microbiology
and other related areas,]
(23)      Desiring to promote international cooperation and exchange of
bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins, and equipment, materials and scientific
and technological information in the field of biotechnology for purposes not
prohibited under the Convention to [enhance] [ensure] the economic and
technological development of all States Parties [to the Protocol],
(22)[(25) Recalling that, in accordance with the Declaration of Principles
adopted at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, States
should cooperate to strengthen endogenous capacity-building for sustainable
development by improving scientific understanding through exchanges of scientific
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and technical knowledge, and by enhancing the development, adaptation, diffusion
and transfer of technologies, including new and innovative technologies,]
(23)(24) Emphasizing the increasing importance of the implementation of the
provisions of Article X of the Convention and the obligations of each State Party
under that Article [as well as under Article VII of the Protocol], especially in the light
of recent scientific and technological developments in the field of biotechnology,
bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes, which have
vastly increased the potential for cooperation between States to help to promote
economic and social development, and scientific and technological progress
[particularly in developing countries] [in conformity with their interests, needs and
priorities],
(24)[(26) Determined to promote international cooperation on all developments
in the field of frontier science and high technology in areas relevant to the
Convention, and urging all States Parties the developed countries possessing
advanced biotechnology and knowledge in such fields as medicine, public health and
agriculture to adopt positive measures and to continue to promote technology transfer
and cooperation on an equal and non-discriminatory basis, in particular with the
developing countries, for the benefit of all mankind,]
(25)(27) Convinced that to contribute as effectively as possible to the
prohibition and complete elimination of prevention of [the proliferation of]
[weapons of mass destruction, including] biological and toxin weapons, and thereby
to enhance international peace and security, all States Parties to the Convention
should become States Parties to this Protocol,
(26)(28) Convinced that the most effective way to ensure a world free of
biological and toxin weapons is to strengthen the Convention through appropriate
measures, including provisions for international verification of such measures,[in
particular] [including] through enhanced transparency and compliance provisions,
(27)(29) Determined to strengthen and improve the effective implementation of
the Convention,
Have agreed as follows:
